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CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW:
CONSIDERING THE CASE FOR ANTECEDENTS
ROGERS M. SMITH*
As a scholar of constitutionalism, I found Tom Ginsburg's, Constitutionalism: East Asian Antecedents, both informative and intriguing,
like all of his excellent scholarship.1 But I lack the expertise to evaluate
his characterizations of the political and legal histories of China, Japan,
and Korea, so the contribution I attempt in this response is conceptual:
I seek to identify questions that I believe scholars should consider,
rather than argue for definitive answers to those questions. If there is a
critical aspect to these comments, it is not that Ginsburg is wrong on
any substantive point. It is that the focus of his analysis may lead us to
neglect features of East Asian traditions that represent challenges to,
rather than anticipations of, modern written constitutionalismchallenges that, if we attend to them, might prove instructive.
My starting point is the relationship of what Ginsburg calls "constitutionalism" to the more general topics addressed in many of the
other contributions to this symposium: the "rule of law," or the very
"idea of law" more generally. The original workshop papers, and those
collected here, provide convincing evidence that many East Asian societies do have significant traditions of the rule of law-but those societies also display more ambivalence than some Western countries about
the feasibility and desirability of such rule. To be sure, Western thinkers from Aristotle on have recognized the reality that causes ambivalence about law in many Eastern thinkers. Law, understood as a body
of relatively fixed general rules, always needs to be applied to particular situations-and generally desirable rules can often produce less
than desirable results when applied to particular situations that vary
in some ways from those imagined by the people promulgating the
rules. If the best outcomes are to be achieved in those cases, some de-

* Christopher H. Brown Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.
1. See generally Tom Ginsburg, Constitutionalism: East Asian Antecedents, 88 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 11 (2012).
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partures from the general rules, which is to say some departures from
the rule of law, may be required. As Aristotle put it,
[I]n situations where it is necessary to speak in universal terms but
impossible to do so correctly, the law takes the majority of cases, fully realizing in what respect it misses the mark... [I]n a situation in
which the law speaks universally, but the case at issue happens to
fall outside the universal formula, it is correct to rectify the shortcoming, in other words, the omission and mistake of the lawgiver
due to the generality of his statement. Such a rectification corresponds to what the lawgiver himself would have said if he were present... 2
Many of the papers in this symposium suggest that, though it is a
matter of degree, in many East Asian societies, particularly those
strongly shaped by Confucian traditions, there has long been a stronger emphasis than in the modern West on these limitations of law and
the rule of law. Consequently, these political communities have placed
greater faith in resolving disputes through reliance on the pragmatic
application of unwritten social norms, rather than on the strict application of written general rules, in order to achieve harmonious and beneficial outcomes. This approach to dispute resolution, of course, gives
decision-makers discretionary authority that may be subject to corruption, abuse, incompetence, and discriminatory decision-making, as
most Asian, as well as Western scholars, recognize. Yet it still appears
settled that both descriptively and normatively, one characteristic feature of East Asian perspectives is their comparatively greater stress on
not conforming strictly to the rule of law, understood as the application
of relative fixed general rules.
Tom Ginsburg focuses here not on the idea of law or the rule of
law put so generally, but more specifically on "constitutionalism."3 He
sees constitutionalism as originally instantiated in the first modern
written constitutions adopted in the U.S., France, and Poland in the late
1700S.4 Ginsburg describes constitutionalism as an effort to limit government via law-it is the pursuit of the "ideal of limited government
under law"-and he stresses that it involves more than efforts to limit
particular subordinate agencies of government.5 Ginsburg defines
those attempts as simply "legality"-the rule of law applied by the top
government officials to their subordinates.6 Constitutionalism aims
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 141-42 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).
Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
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higher. It seeks to constrain whoever is regarded as sovereign in and
over an entire government, whether the sovereign is a monarch or a
democratic people.7
Ginsburg also indicates that in constitutionalism, these constraints
on the sovereign are not merely procedural; they limit the substance of
what the sovereign can do, along with the means through which the
sovereign's ends can be pursued.8 For example, not only must rituals
be performed in certain ways; in some times and places gifts to the
ruling court must be returned, and forced labor can be imposed only at
seasonable times.9 Constitutionalist restraints are also not purely
normative.1o They must be institutionalized in ways that involve some
kind of minimally effective enforcement mechanism, such as the remonstrations of a Board of Rituals.11
Constitutionalism's constraints therefore act, Ginsburg suggests,
as general means to limit governments from doing what they should
not do, even as constitutionalism empowers them to do what they
should do.12 Constitutional limitations serve as specific means of
achieving the advantages of precommitment-imposing restraints on
short-term actions to achieve long-term benefits.13 To sum up Ginsburg's view of constitutionalism in a somewhat fuller formula than he
offers: constitutionalism means the use of written constitutions to limit
and empower sovereigns by law, both procedurally and substantively,
in order to maximize the beneficial contributions of governments and
limit their dangers.14
I fully accept this definition of constitutionalism. Among other
things, it enables us to consider two further potentially illuminating
questions. The first is: what is the relationship of this notion of constitutionalism to "the rule of law" or the "idea of law"? Are they identical
or distinct, and if distinct, in what ways? The second question is: do the
East Asian concerns about the limitations of the rule of law I have men-

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.at 21, 25.
10. Id. at 17.
11. Id. at 29.
12. Id at 12-13.
13. Id. at 14-15.
14. See id. at 13-18. Ginsburg defines constitutionalism "in the simple way as limited government under law that could not be changed through ordinary means." Id at 13. He defines
constitutionalist norms as "those of a legal characterthat constrain the sovereign itself not merely
the agents of the sovereign." Id. at 17.
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tioned apply to Ginsburg's definition of constitutionalism-at all, or to
a lesser, equal, or greater extent?
Let me offer some tentative answers. One might contrast "constitutionalism" and "the rule of law" by holding, as Ginsburg appears to
do, that the rule of law is not as comprehensive as constitutionalism in
ordering all of a government's basic institutions.15 Perhaps the rule of
law can be reasonably understood to bind only citizens or subjects of
the law and some government officials or agencies, but not all, and
particularly not the constitution's sovereign. I think there is something
to this distinction, but it can be overstated. It strikes me more as a matter of degree.
On the one hand, the more we find in a political community institutions and actors that are not thought to be bound by law, the less
likely we are to say that the rule of law exists at all in that community.
The logic of the rule of law pushes in the direction of making it comprehensive-eventually applicable even to the sovereign, which would
transform the "rule of law" into full-fledged "constitutionalism" in
Ginsburg's terms. On the other hand, in every written constitution that
I know, there are procedures by which the sovereign can alter that
constitution, in most if not all respects.16 Yet, if the sovereign can
modify whatever constitutional constraints on sovereign power exist,
then even "constitutionalist" regimes appear in practice not much
more fully limited by law than systems offering mere "legality."
We might reasonably conclude, then, that constitutionalism rarely
if ever imposes permanent procedural or substantive limits on sovereigns-or at a minimum, that constitutionalist regimes do not have to
include any such permanent limits in order to be deemed constitutionalist. And if that is the case, then constitutionalism is generally, if not
always, less than fully and finally comprehensive in the limits, powers,
and substantive commitments it provides. If the logic of the rule of law
pushes toward becoming more comprehensive in its regulatory impact, while the logic of constitutionalism generally does not require
insulating much if anything from sovereign amendment, then the two
concepts appear less distinct than they may initially seem.
The contrast between the rule of law and constitutionalism also
becomes less sharp when we consider the second question I noted: the
relationship of constitutionalism to the widely recognized need to

15. Seeid.atll.
16. See e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; 1958 CONST. art. 11, 58 (France); INDIA CONST. art 368.
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modify strict adherence to written general rules in order to accommodate particular circumstances. Though Ginsburg rightly stresses that
modern constitutionalism has come to rely extensively on written constitutions,17 it also remains true, first, that we speak of some countries
like Britain and Israel as having "unwritten," or at best partly written,
constitutions. These modern Western societies have institutions and
practices that impose limits on sovereign governments through invocations of norms and customs more than written rules. The Korean
judicial decision in regard to the location of the capital in Seoul that
Ginsburg citesia is a very comparable example of a court giving weight
to what it sees as a binding but unwritten constitution. One can readily
imagine a similar ruling by an English court should there be an effort to
move the capital from London (the question of the historically rightful
capital of Israel is, of course, far more intensely contested).
Second, as Ginsburg notes, written constitutional rules always
have to be interpreted, and in many times and places they have been
consciously and explicitly interpreted by judges, executive officers, and
other officials in ways that seek to express and honor prevailing social
norms, values, and practices.19 Ronald Dworkin gained enduring international prominence by arguing that such broader social values have
to have some place in any coherent constitutional jurisprudence.2o He
has long contended that sometimes it might be appropriate for constitutional courts to judge, on the basis of the most coherent and substantively persuasive accounts of moral values available to them, that some
who violate laws should not be punished.21 Instead the laws requiring
punishment should be changed.22 So for both these reasons, constitutionalism, too, involves supplements to, and sometimes departures
from, written legal texts, not just in practice but also in principle. These
features of written constitutionalism also make it, like the rule of law,
less than fully comprehensive in ordering political life.
I suggest, then, that we see modern written constitutionalism as at
one end of a spectrum of possibilities for instantiating the idea of the

17. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 12.
18. See id. at 32 n.109 (citing Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2004Hun-M554 & 556 (consol.), Oct. 21, 2004, (16-2(B) KCCR 1) (S. Kor.) (ruling that Korean President Roh Moo Hyun could
not fulfill his campaign promise to move the capital to a different city because this would violate
"constitutional custom," though not any express constitutional provision)).
19. Id. at 14-17.
20. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 106-07, 149 (1977).

21. Id. at 221-22.
22. Id. at 222.
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rule of law. It is the pole of possibilities that places very strong emphasis on making the powers, the purposes, and particularly, the limits
imposed by law as explicit as possible, as comprehensive as possible,
and, especially, as binding on the sovereign as possible, with identifiable institutions (not necessarily courts) charged with enforcing those
constraints. Yet even at this end of the pole, in practice written constitutionalism may not prove sufficient to resolve all disputes, and it may
not bind the sovereign in many important respects, at least over time.
If this understanding is correct, then Ginsburg's paper provides
evidence that the notion of constitutionalism is certainly not unknown
or alien to East Asian societies. In fact, if written constitutionalism is
not quite so comprehensive or as mechanically applicable as some of
its proponents (not Ginsburg) have presented it as being, the gap between many traditional East Asian understandings of governance and
constitutionalism may be even less than Ginsburg indicates.
Yet the gap persists nonetheless. Written constitutionalism still
involves a significantly stronger embrace of written general rules to
limit and guide governments than appears to have been characteristic
of many East Asian societies throughout history and, in many cases,
still today. To see precedents for constitutionalism in the past of East
Asian societies like Japan and Korea is therefore not wrong. But to
stress these precedents risks understating the ambivalence toward
strict adherence to the rule of law that has clearly been a powerful
presence in these societies (and far from absent in most Western societies). Such understatement might, in turn, circumscribe reflection on
how far that ambivalence is justified, on what implications it might
have for the practice of written constitutionalism, and on consideration
of alternative ways to achieve the values that written constitutionalism
pursues.
These concerns stem in part from my perception that, although
Ginsburg's paper credibly identifies some examples in Japan and Korea
of and precedents for constitutionalism as he defines it,23 they are at
best weakly constitutionalist examples. For Japan, Ginsburg first discusses Article XVI of the 604 C.E. Shotoku constitution, the provision
that exhorts all authorities, presumably including the shogun, to honor
an appropriate temporal schedule when requiring forced labor.24
Ginsburg then cites the provisions of the 1232 C.E. Goseibai shikimoku
23. See Ginsburg,supra note 1, at 20-30 (describing precedents of constitutionalism in Japan
and Korea).
24. Id. at21-22.
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governing land ownership and providing guidance to vassals, which
some scholars believe helped to shield the rights of vassals against
sovereign violations, and the 1336 C.E. Kemmu Formulary, which includes the requirement for the shogun to return gifts, among other
provisions.25 But, Ginsburg does not identify any institutionalized enforcement mechanisms for these restrictions, which is perhaps why he
sometimes refers to them as only "quasi-constitutional,"26 suggesting
they are precedents for the idea of legal limits on sovereign power but
not yet the real thing. He nonetheless concludes that they represent
"genuine, albeit nascent, constitutionalism."27
For Korea, Ginsburg's examples are the promulgated codes and
legislative writings of the Choson dynasty that provided guidelines for
the conduct of many official rituals and procedures for making new
laws.28 The latter had to be ratified by a censorate and certified by a
Board of Rituals, occupied by members of the bureaucratic-scholar
class.29 Ginsburg suggests that both the bureaucratic-scholars' deliberations and their remonstrations for violations of process and ritual did
effectively constrain Korean kings, making these features of Korean
governance evidence of "constitutionalism in practice."30 He also notes
that their impact was mostly on administrative matters and not substantive constitutional issues.31 In the Korean case, then, there do appear to have been institutionalized enforcement mechanisms for
written codes, but their scope clearly falls short of any comprehensive,
substantive system of constraints on the sovereign and governmentand Ginsburg does not indicate that anyone thought they were on the
way to becoming such a system or should be on the way to becoming
so. These therefore still seem examples, at best, of weak and limited
constitutionalism.
More controversially, let me also suggest that it is at best debatable to see these historic practices as examples of "nascent" or "proto-"
constitutionalism, as Ginsburg calls them.32 Doing so carries the implication that it was and is normatively appropriate and empirically likely
over time for these societies to become much more fully "constitution25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id at 23-26.
See e.g., id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27-30.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id.
See e.g., id, at 18, 26, 28, 31.
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alist," as Ginsburg has defined the term, relying heavily on institutionalized enforcement of written legal limits on sovereign power. It seems
at least as plausible to conclude that although these East Asian societies do display awareness and some support for what Westerners see
as constitutionalism, it has long been a very limited kind of support,
both in principle and in practice. And that limited support has arguably
not reflected these societies' "underdevelopment" so much as the
longstanding doubts of many of their leaders and members about the
desirability of unqualified reliance on the written rule of law-doubts
that, again, seem characteristic of many East Asian political traditions.
Ginsburg's choices of evidence and emphasis appear to express a
deep underlying confidence that those doubts are, for the most part,
misguided. His arguments throughout suggest that he believes that
establishing written constitutionalism, enforced by institutions that
effectively sustain legal limits on sovereigns (whether autocrats or
democratic majorities) is a very good thing for any political society.
That is why he treats the discovery of historical precedents that may
help further legitimate constitutionalism in East Asian societies as a
good thing. If those indeed are Ginsburg's guiding beliefs, they are
highly plausible ones, at least to me. As someone profoundly shaped by
the political culture of a society that originated in a revolution against a
distant centralized government acting in apparent violation of both
written legal guarantees and unwritten constitutional norms, I too am
inclined to believe that scholarship that provides reasons for East
Asian societies to adopt systems and practices of written constitutionalism, as Ginsburg defines them, is on the whole very desirable. Yet, I
feel obliged to register two worries. First, if we simply go through East
Asian history looking for precedents not just for the "rule of law," but
specifically for "written constitutionalism," we risk distorting that history, making it appear far more congenial to the modern adoption of
Western-style written constitutionalism than is in fact true-even if
we soften the distinction between "legality" and "constitutionalism" as
I have suggested we can reasonably do. We may therefore not grasp
the legal and political dynamics of those societies as well as we seek.
Second, and perhaps even more fundamentally, we may fail to
learn important lessons for governance everywhere from the traditional East Asian doubts about not only the feasibility, but also the desirability, of constitutionalism and the rule of law in their strongest
forms. Although it goes against the grain both of my own education and
experience-indeed, precisely because it goes against the grain of my
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education and experience, which may distort my judgment in these
regards-I am reluctant to rule out, without a good deal of further reflection, the possibility that reliance on unwritten but commonly practiced social norms and pragmatic reasoning about their proper
application may be preferable to written general laws in a wider range
of circumstances than Western scholars tend to think. It seems prudent
instead to try to understand as fully as possible just why many East
Asian societies, particularly those strongly influenced by Confucian
traditions, have often resisted written legalism accompanied by enforcing institutions and what the results of that resistance have been. Furthermore, it seems prudent to consider whether those results suggest
that there may be places along the spectrum, ranging from overwhelming reliance on full-blown written constitutionalism to a much more
limited practice of the "rule of law," that are not only more empirically
descriptive of government practices in a wide range of locations, but
actually more normatively desirable. I do not argue that this is the
case; in fact I remain skeptical about whether it is so. But I do think
scholars exploring constitutionalism and the rule of law in East Asia
are likely to produce more penetrating analyses if they and we remain
open to the possibility that at least some East Asian doubts about written constitutionalism may just be right.

